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CHURCH RESPONSES IN EASTERN EUROPE TO GORBACHEV'S REFORMS 
"THE LIBERALIZING CONTEXT: HUNGARY" 
By Leslie Laszlo 
Dr. Leslie Laszlo (Roman Catholic) is a professor of political science at the Loyola 
campus of Concordia University, Montreal, Que. Canada. He is a native of Hungary 
and a member of OPREE's editorial advisory board. His previous articles were 
published in OPREE Vol. I. No. 5 (September, 1981) and Vol. I, No. 6 (November, 
1981). This was a paper prepared for the 21st National Convention of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) to be held in Chicago, 
Illinois, November 2-5, 1989. 
Mikhail Gorbachev did not bring reforms to Hungary since in Hungary these were 
initiated years before his arrival to power in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, his call for 
glasnost, perestroika and democratization strengthened the hands of the reformers and helped 
to speed up their time-table. Gorbachev's repeated assurances of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other socialist countries1 seem to have removed the threat of Soviet 
intervention, the dread of a repeat of 1956 in Hungary, or 1968 in Czechoslovakia. This 
renunciation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine was bound to embolden the reformers, while 
it must have disheartened the remaining die-hard Stalinists. In any event, the effect on 
Hungary was an upsurge of ever louder demands for sweeping reforms in all spheres of 
public life, including religion. 
It should be noted that while the Communist leaders of Hungary accepted the need for 
thoroughgoing reforms already in the 1960's , it was done primarily because of economic 
necessity. But then they were forced, however reluctantly, to broaden the scope of "new 
thinking" to encompass other areas that lie far beyond their original intentions. As it was, 
the Hungarian movement toward reform time and again stalled and even reversed2 until the 
pent up frustration over unfulfilled expectations burst forth with force in all directions. 
The Gates Open ... 
The need to involve the Churches in remodeling and revitalizing the stagnant society has 
been widely recognized. Since 1985, new regulations regarding church-state relations had 
been promised by the state authorities.3 In their view the "agreements" between the State and 
the Churches dating back to 1948-1950, were obsolete and no longer enforced. In spite of 
this, nothing was done for years to change the situation--proof that religion was not among 
the priorities on the agenda either of the reform-minded Communists, or of the emerging 
"opposition."4 Nevertheless, in the context of demands for human rights and democratic 
freedoms, the question of freedom of conscience, including freedom of religion and the free 
activity of the Churches, was bound to and,  indeed did emerge, as one of the basic premises 
of true democracy. 
The course of events took a dramatic turn in the beginning of 1988 when the extent of 
Hungary's foreign indebtedness and the rapidly approaching bankruptcy of her economy had 
been revealed. This meant the end of the borrowed prosperity of recent years, of the much 
touted "Goulash communism"--a hard blow for the Hungarian consumer who was totally 
unprepared for such calamity. The old guard around Janos Kadar was now in full retreat,5 
the reformers within the HSWP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) were gaining decisive 
influence over policy making, and the opposition groups were clamoring for radical changes 
not only in samizdat publications but also in well-publicized public meetings and even in the 
government owned media. Interestingly, the call for freedom of conscience and for the end 
of government-imposed restrictions on the free exercise of religion came louder through the 
government media, especially on the pages of the daily Magyar Nemzet, than in the 
statements and publications emanating from the Churches. These latter remained tame and 
extremely cautious in face of the avalanche of reform ideas and the actual changes which 
were rumbling on. 
Prime Minister K aroly Grosz invited church leaders to a meeting to discuss with 
government officials pending legislation on church polity.6 This meeting, which took place 
in his own office at the parliament building on March 14, 1988,  was the first step toward 
constructive dialogue between the government and Churches. 
On this occasion, during a three-hour-long discussion with the Prime Minister, Primate 
Laszlo Paskai, the recently named Archbishop of Esztergom, recommended that the projected 
bill be of regulative and not restrictive character. Furthermore, he asked that the state 
should ensure the freedom for the Churches which is necessary for them to function 
according to their nature. This ability to function implies, according to the Primate, all that 
the Church needs to exercise its mission, i.e., freedom of worship, of teaching, of association 
(including religious orders), of maintaining schools, publishing houses, and access to the 
electronic media. He also asked the Prime Minister for legislation to permit conscientious 
objectors to perform an "alternative service" instead of bearing arms. 7 Bishop J6zsef Szendi 
of Veszprem was more outspoken. He reminded the Prime Minister that the existing 
agreements with the state were signed by an intimidated hierarchy under duress. He called 
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for new, equitable legislation, for the removal of all restrictions on religious instruction, and 
for the freedom to re-establish all the religious orders which were dissolved by government 
decree. Furthermore, he demanded unrestricted opportunity for the Church to work with 
the youth and for Catholic youth organizations to function and to have their own journals. 
This intervention by Bishop Szendi was published only in "samizdat" form, but it quickly 
spread all over the country, and not just among Catholics.8 
Shortly after his historic meeting with the church representatives Karoly Grosz was 
elected on May 23, 1988,  by a special Party Conference of the HSWP to replace Janos Kadar 
as General Secretary of the Party. Thus, he became the leader of both the Party and of the 
government.9 In mid-August, according to press reports, Primate Paskai, who received the 
Cardinal's hat from Pope John Paul II on June 28, 1988 ,  was notified by the government in 
a letter about all the salient features included in the Law on Church Policy being drafted. 10 
The letter said that the government's aim was "regulation" rather than "restriction" of 
religious life, and it asked for "active participation of the Churches" in preparing the draft, 
stating that "only a Church that functions properly can be effective in helping us realize our 
social goals." The letter holds out the prospect of "legal guarantees for the autonomous 
activity of the Churches" and the elimination of "all discrimination on account of religious 
belief," including discrimination against teachers for their religious convictions. As a further 
concession, the Churches would no longer be required to request state permission to hold 
religious instruction for the young or to report the names of those taking part to the 
authorities. Moreover, religious instruction would no longer be restricted to Sundays. The 
proposed law would lift the present limit on the number of pupils in church schools including 
those run by Catholic monastic orders. Teachers in church schools would no longer have to 
reapply for a new work p-ermit each year but would receive a one-time unlimited permit. 
According to the letter, the government was planning to "reduce the number of church 
positions requiring state approval" and to ease restrictions on church building, repairs and 
receiving gifts from abroad. Churches would no longer need permission to organize public 
religious festivities and processions but would only have to notify the authorities of the dates 
and places. Bishops would no longer be required to submit their circulars to state censors. 
The government also indicated that it was prepared to allow clergymen wider access to 
minister in hospitals, convalescent homes, and possibly in prisons and reformatories. 
In two important areas, the government showed itself still reluctant to make concessions. 
First, the letter made it clear that some of the monastic orders outlawed in 1950 would not 
be "relegalized" although they did not rule out the possibility of re-establishing some others. 
Second, the letter did not promise to fulfill the Churches' long-standing wish to increase 
their publishing activities but said that the question would be examined. 
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The limits of the government's new-found generosity were demonstrated in  the 
repercussions to an article written by Bishop Endre Gyulay of Szeged-Csanad entitled, "With 
Understanding and Patience," published in the government daily Magyar Hirlap on July 13, 
1988.  In that Gyulay challenged the authorities to "speak about the mistakes, abuses, and 
wrong-doings of their "predecessors' ," and to "acknowledge publicly that they need a living 
church able to do its work." Only this "would guarantee that (the authorities) words are not 
tactical tricks." Gyulay also demanded the rehabilitation of church figures condemned in 
show trials, writing that such a gesture "would help heal the wounds that the Church still 
bears." He ended his article with an emphatic plea: for an end of all discrimination, especially 
in the hiring practices towards religious believers. Gyulay's article drew a public rebuke 
from the Chairman of the State Office for Chl;lrch Affairs, Imre Miklos. At the reception 
in honor of Primate Paskai's elevation to Cardinal, Miklos broke into a tirade against a 
"Bishop, who sought popularity by publishing in a newspaper some pathetic and rhetorical 
questions that do not speak well of his leadership qualities."11 Gyulay's answer to Miklos' 
personal attack was not long in coming. In a speech at a birthday celebration the bishop 
repeated his conviction that "the era of blind subservience toward the authorities" was over. 
"The spirit of the new age bids us to speak out," he said. "We all have this responsibility."12 
There was evidently a new era dawning in church-state relations, affecting also the 
Protestant Churches which began re-claiming some of their "nationalized" schools. The new 
spirit of greater tolerance and even cooperation in a growing number of issues was reflected 
in a plethora of scholarly conferences and celebrations organized jointly by church and state 
organs, as well as in the way the media reported these events. Apart from such international 
gatherings as the Congress of the Lutheran World Federation in 1984, the International 
Symposium of Marxist and Catholic Scholars in 1986, the Meeting of the Executive of the 
World Jewish Congress in 1987,  the General Assembly of the World Federation of Bible 
Societies in 1988 - all of which were held in Budapest, a city vying to become an 
international convention center - there had been symposia on Hungarian subjects which had 
been either neglected previously, or were given an unabashedly biased Marxist interpretation. 
An example of the re-evaluation of the Church's role in Hungary's past was the Peter 
Pazmany symposium organized jointly by the Bishops' Conference, the Academy of Sciences 
and the University of Budapest, February 29 - March 12, 1988.  Peter Cardinal Pazmany, 
who died 350 years ago, was the leader of the Counter-Reformation in 17th century 
Hungary. Founder of Budapest University and numerous other schools, he was a great 
patriot, politician, orator and writer. He, more than anyone else in his time, helped to 
transform the archaic structure of medieval Hungarian to an easily flowing modern idiom. 
After World War II, for obvious reasons, the name of this Catholic prelate, a giant in 
Hungarian history, was barely mentioned, while his great contributions to Hungarian culture 
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were minimized if not altogether ignored. Now, however, Cardinal Pazmany was 
rehabilitated by the Marxist and non-Marxist participants in the symposium and, figuratively 
speaking, he was restored to his pedesta1.13 Shortly after this event, and perhaps inspired by 
it, a Workshop of Church History was created with the participation of Marxist and non­
Marxist, Catholic and Protestant historians. 
Over and above the propitious beginnings of a real thaw in church-state relations, the 
year 1988 had a special significance for the Hungarian Catholic Church. In addition to the 
celebrations of the world-wide Marian Year, proclaimed by Pope John Paul II, Hungarians 
remembered the 50th anniversary of the XXXIV Eucharistic World Congress of 1938 in 
Budapest, and also the 950th anniversary of the death of Saint Stephen, the founder of the 
Christian kingdom of Hungary. A symP.osium devoted to the memory of the holy King was 
jointly held by the Bishops' Conference and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, June 21-
22, 1988.  The "feudal king Stephen I," whose role as builder of the state was belittled in the 
history books of the last forty years, had regained his title "Saint" as he is called now even 
by the Marxist historians and in the government media. He is highly praised for his 
statecraft and his accomplishments which have been of lasting significance for the Hungarian 
nation. This "rehabilitation" process reached its high-water mark when on August 20, the 
feast day of St. Stephen, renamed Constitution Day since the Communist take-over, Politburo 
member Janos Berecz, the HSWP's Central Committee Secretary for ideology, hailed Stephen 
as "the first among the great Hungarians and great ancestors whose memory and work is 
sacred to all decent patriots." Furthermore, he assured the p'ublic that the present 
government was willing to act "in the spirit of St. Stephen's continually valid message."14 
Religious celebrations of St. Stephen's Year, as 1988 was named by the Catholic Bishops' 
Conference, were organized countrywide. At specific dates, the ornate reliquary with the 
Holy Right--the preserved right hand of St. Stephen--was transported by armored car of 
the state police to each episcopal see, and there it was exposed to veneration in the cathedral 
and/or the largest public square. On August 19, at Szekesfehervar, the city where the holy 
King was buried, Bruno Straub, the President of the Hungarian People's Republic, gave the 
festive address. In the presence of the special Papal Legate, Archbishop Francesco 
Colasuonno, and other distinguished guests, Straub praised St. Stephen for his wisdom of 
learning about the world surrounding his country and for recognizing the necessity of timely 
constitutional changes in order to survive. Applying this wisdom to today's situation, he 
declared that the key to Hungary's further development was "the respect for democracy." 
This was unimaginable "without constitutional arrangements of the relations between the state 
and the citizens and also between the state power and the church."15 
On August 20, St. Stephen's Day, an outdoor mass was celebrated by Cardinal Primate 
Paskai on the steps of the St. Stephen Basilica in Budapest before a crowd estimated at 
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40,000.16 Before the mass the Cardinal read the letter of Pope John Paul II addressed to 
Hungarian Catholics and then he repeated St. Stephen's offering the country to the Holy 
Virgin, the Magna Domina Hungarorum. At the end of the ceremonies, he announced that 
the government and the bishops had invited His Holiness the Pope to visit Hungary_l7 The 
entire event was broadcast live by the Hungarian state television. Perhaps the most 
noteworthy in all this is what was transpiring in the official speeches and writings celebrating 
the first king, namely the message that Hungary is at a difficult turning point, just as it was 
at St. Stephen's time. The leadership, therefore, needs the support of a united people in 
facing the arduous task of a complete overhaul of the· socio-economic structure. 18 
... and the Tide Rushes in 
The process of revolutionary changes in Hungary which began in I 988 accelerated by 
1 989 to an astonishing degree. The "establishment" Communists were forced into the 
defensive even within their own party. The reform-wing, led by Politburo member Imre 
Pozsgai who advocates the transformation of the Party into a Western European type of 
Social Democracy, is slowly but surely gaining the upper hand.19 The government of Miklos 
Nemeth,.Jt.Young Harvard educated economist, has committed itself to hold multi-party free 
elections by June I 990 at the latest. The Communist Party (HSWP) was pressured to sit down 
to round table discussions with the opposition groups and to agree to a new constitution 
which would effectively put an end to its monopoly of power. As to the Party's monopoly 
of information, that seems to have been finished for good. In Hungary today the freedom 
of speech, of press and of assembly is a fact, regardless of the Party's intentions or wishes. 
TV and radio commentators, journalists, cameramen, professionals, students, workers and 
people in general, do not ask and wait for permission to organize clubs and associations, or 
to write, broadcast, publish, and to sell publications, but just go ahead and do it. 20 
The most extraordinary feat of the "opposition" and the most spectacular showing of their 
strength was the solemn reburial of Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of the 1 956 Revolution 
who had been executed as a traitor by his erstwhile cabinet colleague, Janos Kadar. The 
rehabilitation of Nagy and the Revolution had been fiercely opposed by Party General 
Secretary Karoly Grosz and the majority of his Politburo until virtually the last minute; 
however, the preparations went ahead and when the date arrived on June 16, the 31st 
anniversary of the executions, over 200,000 paid their homage on Budapest's Heroes' Square 
to the victims of the repression which followed the I 956 Revolution. Since it was a day of 
work, the rest of the nation watched on TV at their work place or at home the impressive 
ceremonies which included prayers and blessing of the graves by clergy of the Christian and 
Jewish faiths. Among those present were Prime Minister Nemeth, the leader of the reform-
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wing of the Party, Minister of the State and member of the Politburo Pozsgai, as well as 
official representatives of the Soviet Union and of nearly all of the socialist countries and of 
the most important non-governing Communist parties, plus the Ambassador of the United 
States among other dignitaries from the world over. Three weeks later, on July 6, the very 
day Janos Kadar died, the Supreme Court of Hungary annulled all criminal charges against 
Imre Nagy and his fellow defendants, declaring them to have been innocent victims of a 
politically motivated frame-up. 
Strange as it may sound, the reaction of the official leadership of the Churches to these 
momentous events was timid and hesitant. On the eve of the reburial of Nagy, the leaders 
of the Christian Churches and he Chief Rabbi of Hungary did issue a joint statement in 
which they made a passing reference to. the "crucible of grave moral, spiritual, economic and 
political crises" which the nation was passing through, but the rest of the document was only 
a plea to all Hungarians for mutual forgiveness, exhorting them to renounce all thought of 
revenge and to work instead together for a better future in harmony and love.21 
During the ever more heated debate about the re-evaluation of Hungary's recent past and 
her future direction, the Churches remained passive; their muted voice was only rarely heard. 
The discussions concerning the new constitution and its clause on the freedom of conscience 
and of religion was conducted between the government, i.e., the Communists, and the 
opposition groups, notably the most vocal among them, the Democratic Forum.22 It was the 
opposition which first raised the issue of the rehabilitation of the victims of religious 
persecution and demanded the abolition of the notorious State Office for Church Affairs 
which kept the Churches in bondage since its creation in 1 95 1 ,  while the Churches were 
dutifully collaborating with the Office and were obeying its orders apparently without 
murmur until its very demise in June 1 989.23 
To understand , if not to excuse this servile attitude, one should bear in mind the severe 
oppression the Churches had to suffer for the past forty years and also the fact that it was 
that very State Office for Church Affairs, and notably its long-time head Imre Mikl6s,24 who 
had a decisive say in filling all important posts in the Churches. This was especially true in 
the Protestant denominations where the traditional right of the congregations to elect their 
presiding officers had been subverted and effectively eliminated by the Communists. Even 
in the Catholic Church, the Holy See needed the consent of the government to all episcopal 
appointments;25 otherwise, the bishop was prevented to occupy his see and exercise his 
office. As a result, all church leaders were Miklos' appointees who were selected by him 
exactly because of their propensity to follow government orders and not show too much 
independence. It is no surprise therefore that in the Protestant Churches the clergy and the 
laity are in the process of forcing the resignation and replacement of their bishops and lay 
leaders whom they accuse of excessive collaboration with the Communists;26 in the Catholic 
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Church there is pressure on Primate Paskai from some of his fellow bishops, but also from 
the lower clergy and from laymen, to show more initiative and vigour vis-a-vis the regime 
in demanding the restoration of the rights of the church. 
This pressure from below was perhaps behind the unprecedented decision of the Catholic 
Bishops' Conference to call a meeting of all the superiors of the religious orders, male and 
female, which existed in Hungary before 1 950 when, with few exceptions, they were banned, 
and to urge them to reorganize their orders and congregations immediately, in other words, 
without waiting for the impending new legislation on religion.27 While the bishops had the 
verbal assent of the government to this action, it was still a bold decision to go ahead without 
proper legal authorization. 
The Bishops Speak 
Amidst the rapid political changes in 1 989, it became increasingly difficult for anybody 
to avoid taking a position. The burning need for "glasnost," "transparency" as to the Christian 
attitude for the restructuring of public life finally prompted the Catholic Bishops' 
Conference to issue a rather long statement "On the Renewal of Church Life and of Society," 
dated July 4, 1 989.28 The introductory part of the statement deals with the post World War 
II history of Hungary and contains a clear indictment of Communist policies in general and 
their persecution of religion and of the Churches in particular. Among the injustices 
suffered, the imprisonment and show trials of the clergy are listed, and the rehabilitation of 
the victims (among whom J6zsef Cardinal Mindszenty is mentioned by name) is demanded. 
Gone are past platitudes about the "freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution" 
and about the "harmonious and satisfactory relations between State and Church under 
Communism" which Hungarian churchmen were forced to repeat ad nauseam both at home 
and abroad. Instead, there is a sober assessment of the present economic and moral crises; 
the blame for which is laid squarely on the shoulders of the Communists. Their blind 
obedience to an atheistic-materialistic ideology, their disregard of human dignity, their gross 
incompetence and mismanagement of the economy, are held chiefly responsible for the 
current ills . In the bishops' view, only a spiritual and moral renewal can bring about a 
successful restructuring of society. To this end they urge all believers to redouble their 
efforts in order to achieve a true renewal of Church life which would revitalize society at 
large. Moreover, the bishops pointed out, while the Church refrains from prescribing or 
recommending any particular type of political system, she did develop the broad principles 
of a Catholic social doctrine and this should help Christians in their endeavor to build a just 
society. The Church pledges its support to this great task, although the Church is concerned 
that after forty years of enforced silence and various disabilities imposed on it, it might not 
8 
be able to live up to all expectations and demands. These greatly exceed its actual strength 
and resources. 
The Road Ahead 
There is indeed a difficult road ahead for Hungary, not only on the way to economic 
recovery but even more so in terms of moral renewal. The bankruptcy of the so-called 
"communist morality" which was supposed to replace traditional Christian ethics and morals, 
has been evident for some time and had been admitted even by the Communists. 29 The main 
reason for the latter's change of attitude toward religion and the Churches was precisely their 
awareness of a deepening moral crises, the phenomenal growth of alcoholism, the rise in 
crimes of all kinds, of suicide, abortion, and juvenile delinquency. One could say that the 
regime turned to the Churches for help in desperation over these worsening social ills. But 
how much help will the Church be able to give? 
To be sure, it is an immense relief for the Churches to have regained their freedom from 
state interference in their internal life and to be able to exercise their mission of unhindered 
evangelization. But would it not be too much to expect from the clergy whose number had 
greatly diminished and whose average age is over 60 years to shed suddenly all traces of the 
dependence and subservience to which they were accustomed and to show a vigorous spirit 
of creative initiative and apostolic zeal in mastering and applying up-to-date pastoral care 
to their flock? Similarly, while the readmission of the religious orders and congregations to 
their ministry is certainly an invaluable bonus for the Catholic Church, one has to bear in 
mind that the dissolution of these communities was ordered in 1 950, so that the very 
youngest of their few surviving members are now in their sixties. It would take years before 
they could rebuild their human resources to such strength that they might again staff the 
number of schools, hospitals, and other institutions for which they once have cared. 
What makes, however, the situation even more serious is that in the meantime two 
generations have grown up without religious instruction; in fact, they were taught that 
religion was nothing but superstition, contrary to science. Most of today's adults are 
woefully ignorant of the basic tenets of the Christian faith and morals. Although the 
prohibition on religious instruction has been lifted, where would the Churches find enough 
qualified teachers of religion needed for the schools which up until now were the temples of 
atheism? And then the gravest question of all: how many of the parents--the majority, even 
in baptized , are non-practicing Christians--would ask for religious instruction to be given 
to their children?30 
To balance this rather gloomy outlook for the immediate future of religion in Hungary, 
there are some indicators which point toward a more positive outcome. The most significant 
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among these, and of the greatest importance, is the strong religious revival in recent years. 
This was observed among the population at large, but it seems to have the most remarkable 
impact on young people, especially the students.31 The phenomenon can be explained, at 
least partially, by the general disillusion with Marxism-Leninism but also with the 
materialism of Western consumerism, prompting people to turn toward spiritual values. In 
any case, this change of hearts, if it means true conversion and is not just a fad, does give 
hope for a genuine revitalization of Church life and, in a larger sense, provides hope for a 
restructuring of the whole society along more humane and spiritual values.32 
The Soviet Connection 
Returning now to the starting point of this essay the question remains, what influence, 
if any, has Gorbachev had on the developments in Hungary described on these pages? The 
connection is indeed tenuous; however, in my opinion it was and is of decisive importance. 
I submit that the developments in Hungary would not have occurred so fast and would 
not have been so far reaching in such a short time, had it not been for Gorbachev and his 
own commitment to radical reforms. As I had mentioned already, reformers everywhere in 
the Communist world were encouraged by the General Secretary's bold actions against those 
dragging their feet and trying to sabotage the reforms, while the conservative hard-liners 
were disheartened. 
Also, in the area of church-state relations, it must have been easier for the Hungarian 
Communists to grant concessions and, ultimately, to put into effect significant reforms, when 
they saw Raisa Gorbachev at the Bolshoi Opera join the highest church dignitaries from all 
over the world to celebrate the millennium of the conversion of Rus to Christianity. 
Furthermore, they must have read about the draft legislation prepared for the Supreme 
Soviet on freedom of religion and learned about the gradual relaxation of anti-religious 
activities and of the modest but real improvement in Church life in the Soviet Union.  
Conversely, there is a real fear in Hungary and elsewhere that should Gorbachev fail-­
and that would most likely mean a backsliding into a Stalinist restoration, or a military 
dictatorship--then the reforms within the Soviet Bloc might be also doomed. The massacre 
on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, seen on live television in Hungary, still haunts those 
welcoming reforms. It is said that there are quite a few good Christians nowadays who offer 
daily prayers for the good health and long life of CPSU General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev. 
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